Proceedings of the 54th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2021

Assembling Algorithmic Decision-Making under Uncertainty: The Case of
‘Edge Cases’ in an Open Data Environment
Tor Rolfsen Grønsund
Department of Informatics,
University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
torrg@ifi.uio.no

Abstract
Algorithmic decision-making is rapidly evolving as
a source of data-driven competitive advantage with
important implications for analytical practices in
multiple settings. Despite the ambitions for
algorithmic and intelligent technologies, however, the
requirement for quality data input to the algorithm
poses a significant challenge for its actual adoption.
The trend towards open data might bring additional
challenges such as strategic gaming and distortion of
meaning. To address this problem, we draw on a twoyear long qualitative case study of a firm in
international maritime trade to understand the role of
uncertainty associated with open data upon the uptake
of a novel algorithm. We combine an uncertainty and
assemblage perspective to unpack the arrangements
by which the organization configures relations of
humans and machine to mitigate this problem. We
highlight the phenomenon of edge cases as a key
challenge for automation and propose that an
assemblage of augmentation and automation allows a
dynamic arrangement that support the introduction
and organization of algorithmic decision-making
under uncertainty.

1. Introduction
Artificial intelligence (AI) including data analytics
and learning algorithms is evolving as a key priority
for decision-making [1] and is already transforming
predictive practices in domains such as medicine, law,
finance, and transportation. Despite the growing
interest in AI among IS (Information Systems)
scholars and practitioners, however, there is a
continuing gap between the ambitions for AI and its
actual adoption [2]. A significant challenge and
probable reason for this gap is that AI places great
demands on the availability of quality data input [3, 4].
Data not only tend to be heterogeneous and
unstructured [5], they tend to be controlled by certain
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organizations [6], be open in the public domain or
becoming a commodity [7, 8, 9]. Whereas control over
data may be a source of competitive advantage [10],
mandated openness can undermine competitiveness to
the extent that competitors or regulators get hold of
strategically sensitive information [11, 12]. In such
environments, increased openness and transparency
can give rise to ‘gaming’ of the data [8, 13, 14] and
‘distortion of meaning’, with performative
consequences for analytics and decision-making [8].
Despite the recognition that the uncertainty associated
with data represent a significant challenge to the
adoption of AI [3, 15, 16, 17], knowledge of what
constitutes a problematic situation and how its
resolution involve arrangement of humans and
algorithms [4], is still limited. Therefore,
understanding the uncertainty associated with open
data might have important implications for how
organizations can “efficiently identify and handle
many types of noisy data” [4] and thus organize upon
the introduction of algorithmic decision-making.
In this paper, we examine these questions in the
context of mandated data openness and explore
organizational arrangements for mitigating the
uncertainty that follows the strategic interests over
externally sourced data. Our research question thus is:
What problematic situations in open data
environments and types of algorithmic decisionmaking involve division of labor between humans and
algorithms?
To answer our research question, we draw on a
two-year long qualitative case study of a brokering
firm in international maritime trade. The firm’s
analytics division acquired near real-time data from
the Automatic Identification System (an open, global
information infrastructure retrieving and transmitting
detailed data on vessel movement) via satellites and
adopted a classification algorithm to support the
prediction of ship behavior and, in turn, global trade
on oil. In this case, classifications of data input were
uncertain due to ‘edge cases’ exemplified by ships (i.e.
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the observed) gaming or distorting data about their
actual activity at sea. Through drawing on the
phenomenon of edge cases in this context, we are
interested to contribute an understanding of what
constitute a problematic situation and the division of
labor between humans and machines that emerges as a
response to this [4].
The concept of edge cases comes with different
meanings, but can generally be understood as cases
that involve input values that require special handling
by the system. We further understand uncertainty
associated with open data edge cases as problematic
“situations which involves unknown or imperfect
information” [16, 21] that constrain the adoption of
algorithmic decision-making, because “uncertainty
refers to the degree to which the future states of the
environment cannot be accurately anticipated or
predicted due to imperfect information” [22].
The paper is structured as follows. First, we review
recent literature on data-driven and algorithmic
decision-making with an emphasis on task automation,
augmentation, and assemblage approaches. Building
on this background, we highlight the phenomenon of
edge cases and combine uncertainty and assemblage
perspectives to develop our analytical frame. Next, we
outline our case study research approach followed by
a brief background description of our case from the
international maritime trade. In the case findings
section, we illustrate four ‘edge cases’ and the case
organization’s responses to these as it sought to
introduce algorithmic decision-making into the fabric
of the organization. In the analysis and discussion, we
elaborate on the relevance of assemblages for evolving
algorithmic decision-making in the context of open
data and uncertainty.

2. Related research and framework
2.1. Automating, augmenting, and assembling
algorithmic decision-making
Newell and Marabelli [1] take data-driven and
algorithmic decision-making to comprise vast data
that are processed by algorithms with the aim of
predicting objects’ behavior based on their current or
past behavior. Similarly, Faraj et al. [23] refer to
learning algorithms as “machine learning,
computation, and statistical techniques .. [that] rely on
large data sets to generate responses, classifications, or
dynamic predictions that resemble those of a
knowledge worker”. Prediction, here understood as
using information you do have to produce information
you do not have [15], then, constitutes a fundamental

task of algorithmic decision-making systems and the
learning algorithms on which these are based [24].
Following an information processing and task
perspective, von Krogh [4] suggests that while such AI
systems entail task input in the form of data and task
processing by algorithms, task outcomes involve
either conclusions based on available data (i.e.
decision-making) or alternative courses of action to
resolve a problem (i.e. problem-solving). Drawing on
this task approach, Rai et al. [25] propose that AI
systems do not only comprise task substitution by
which AI automates or replaces tasks that human used
to perform. They also comprise task augmentation
where humans and AI complement one another to
perform a task; and task assemblages in which humans
and AI are dynamically brought together as an
integrated unit to perform an emergent task [25].
The Information Systems (IS) and organization
literature has already recognized an augmentation
approach [19, 23, 25, 26]. For example, recent
empirical research has showed that organizations
bring humans in the loop of the algorithm to evaluate
cases that are unknown to the algorithm and to
improve the accuracy of the algorithm [27]. Similarly,
in interactive machine learning and active learning
systems [28], an unknown or unconfident task can be
delegated to a human(s) who manually labels (or
annotates or classifies) it, and then feed it back to the
algorithm for learning experience.
While there is a growing interest in algorithmic
decision-making, however, organizational research on
the dynamic configuration of humans and algorithms
upon emergent, problematic tasks, is still limited. Such
inquiry might benefit from the collection and analysis
of rich material on problematic situations [4]. In the
following we therefore adopt edge cases as a
sensitizing concept and take human-algorithm
collaboration as the central analytical component.

2.2. Edge cases, uncertainty, and assemblages
Edge cases, when framed as “situations where little
data exists” [33], relate to uncertainty which refers to
not having enough information [29]. When taken as
“data that are encountered for the first time” [3], edge
cases pertain to ambiguity which denotes “not having
a conceptual framework for interpreting information”
[29]. Furthermore, in big data setting we assume that
edge cases also concern complexity - having to process
more information than you can manage or understand;
and equivocality - having several competing or
contradictory conceptual frameworks [29]. A
framework in this sense can include both machine
learning models and human cognitive frames that rely
on some system of classification. In the case of
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equivocality, then, algorithms and humans can have
contradictory frameworks that may or may not
complement one another.
Zack [29] further argued that machines are more
appropriate for handling decision problems
characterized by complexity and uncertainty, whereas
humans are better suited for handling ambiguity and
equivocality. In this view, problems of uncertainty and
ambiguity can be resolved by acquiring more
information and interpretative frames. However, such
acquisitive processing strategies in turn give rise to
problems of complexity and equivocality. Problems of
complexity and equivocality, on the other hand, might
be resolved by restricting existing information and
diverse interpretations. However, such restrictive
processing strategies appear to come at the expense of
the data scale effects underpinning the promises of
automation underpinning ‘big data’ and AI systems.
Thus, edge cases associated with uncertainty and
complexity emerge as subject to analysis and
automation; while ambiguity and equivocality be
subject to interpretation and augmentation. However,
because the resolution of one decision problem, e.g.,
equivocality, can trigger another problem, e.g.,
uncertainty [29], there is need to understand the
dynamic reconfiguration of the problem-solving
structure.
Rather than taking algorithmic decision-making as
a predefined and stable phenomenon [cf. 18], we are
interested to examine the situations which
configurations of algorithmic decision-making spring
from [19]. We draw on a notion of assemblage that
views humans, algorithms, data and practices as
“heterogeneous components interrelated to one
another in such a way that brings about evolving
patterns of actions” [20]. “Offered in part as
replacements” [18] for the input-processing-output
view and the separation of human and machine, then,
Suchman’s conception of (re)configuration suggests
that an assemblage lens is useful to "expand the space
of interaction from the interface narrowly defined to
the ambient environments and transformed and
transformative subject-object relations that comprise
lived experience of technological practice” [18]. Here,
avocation denotes arrangements and affordances of
through which humans are hailed to enter a
technological assemblage; invocation denotes actions
that define the events that effect changes to the
assemblage; and evocation denotes the material
changes that result and in turn comprise the possibility
of subsequent avocations [18].

3. Case selection and research methods
We conducted an interpretive qualitative case
study [30] of ShipBroker over two years, beginning in
September 2017 and ending in October 2019.
ShipBroker (dubbed for anonymization), a global
shipbrokering firm since the mid-1800, operates a
network of >10 offices worldwide and employs
several hundred employees. The firm intermediates
logistics and commodity freight such as oil and gas on
behalf of cargo owners, ship owners and charterers.
ShipBroker’s services rely upon detailed research and
analysis on current market developments and seaborne
trade. Here, a mission-critical data source is the
Automatic Identification System (AIS), a global
communication and tracking system which is used for
exchange of maritime navigational information
between AIS-equipped terminals. Since 2002, the AIS
is mandatory installation for international ships (or
vessels) with 300 or more gross tonnages. The AIS
works by retrieving GPS coordinates from satellites
and transmitting data on ship behavior and qualities to
nearby stations (including ships, vessel traffic
services, buoys) via VHF radio signals. ShipBroker
relies on AIS data to track ships and ports and in turn
construct aggregates on global trade.
Initial access sprung from an existing development
project between ShipBroker and an enterprise
software company where the first author was
employed during his PhD. Further access was
negotiated between the author and the firms’ top
management in spring 2017 and allowed us to take part
in both strategic and operational activities with
ShipBroker’s research department which specializes
in ‘shipping intelligence’, trade and freight analyses.
Our role and intent as researchers in the field were
clearly communicated to the informants, and
observations and interviews were based on informed
consent and confidentiality about business-critical
information. We have by purpose anonymized the
names and gender of the subjects involved in our
research.
Our main method was participant observation,
complemented by informal interviews, conversation,
and reviews of documentation. Participant observation
were undertaken in a total of 39 meetings and during a
two-week-long design workshop in early 2018. The
meetings were mainly on-site and lasted between
thirty minutes and five hours, with an average duration
of 104 minutes. During our fieldwork, we regularly
conducted informal interviews and conversation,
including in-person meetings, lunch meetings, face-toface conversations in the field as well as over
telephone, to follow up and verify our observations.
We avoided recording our observations and
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conversations so as to ensure openness and trust, and
instead focused our attention on taking notes during
the field work and wrote these out into memos and
narratives shortly after the meetings. We examined
documentary sources including company PowerPointbased market analyses, Excel spreadsheets of ship
voyages, customer contract excerpts, trade journal
articles, newspaper articles, web sites, ship tracking
software, and code such as MySQL queries. We were
also given a company chat and email account on which
we regularly conversed with our key informants.
Conducting the data collection in tandem with data
analysis allowed us to recursively iterate between
emerging empirical material and theoretical concepts
in the datafication, big data analytics, business
intelligence, and AI streams within the IS and
organizational research literature. To guide our
analysis, we adopted a narrative and visual mapping
approach [34]. The narrative approach consisted of
writing theoretical memos to gradually develop more
detailed narratives and vignettes from the data. We
further mapped and organized our material into a
broader set of themes [35] such as “obscuring”,
“secreting”, and “going dark”. Drawing on the
narratives and themes together with our informants,
we set boundaries for our analysis and focused
attention on material revolving around ‘edge cases’.
We complemented this with the visual mapping
approach to generate temporal data bases, which
allowed identification of relevant, more abstract
themes and relationships as we explored data-theory
links in light of new empirical material.

Recurrently referred to as “going dark”, “fake news”,
and "teleporting” among our informants, these data
quality issues (called edge cases) constituted a
significant challenge to the analysts who relied on
accurate and timely data to intermediate exchange of
logistics between ship and cargo owners.
Towards the end of the executive meeting, a new
strategic direction had emerged. First and foremost,
ShipBroker sought to use smart algorithms to turn
external and internal trade data into a strategic asset,
to support human decision-making, and, eventually,
drive competitive advantage. The question of how to
integrate extant digital work with the development of
algorithmic decision-making in face of problematic
data input, however, remained an open question. On
the backdrop of these conditions, we next illustrate
four ‘edge cases’, and the resolutions to these, that
were involved in the work of introducing algorithmic
decision-making into the social fabric of the
organization. Table 1 summarizes the edge cases, their
nature of uncertainty, and the responses to these.
Table 1 Summary of edge cases, uncertainty
characteristics and responses
Edge cases

Nature of uncertainty and responses

The ‘fake
news’ cases

The decision problem was characterized by
complexity where there was a diversity of
spellings/meanings in the destination fields,
and equivocality where the data and its
meaning could be interpreted in multiple
ways e.g., avoiding pirates or distorting for
commercial gain. ShipBroker’s resolution
entailed collective human auditing of the
algorithmic outcome to update the
framework and altering of the algorithm’s
rule set for normalization of choices.

The
withholding
cases

The decision problem mainly was
characterized by uncertainty because there
was not enough information to describe a
current state or to predict future states.

The goingdark cases

The decision problem was characterized by
uncertainty where there was not enough data
to describe a current state, and ambiguity
since there was no sufficient explanation for
the event. ShipBroker’s response involved
acquiring contextual data and interpretation
from domain experts, and then altering the
algorithm to do ‘guesswork’ (i.e. prediction).

The
teleporting
cases

The decision problem was characterized by
ambiguity and equivocality because there was
either no framework to explain the event or
multiple explanations. ShipBroker’s response
entailed deep human-to-human discussions,
however, with no confident explanation.

4. Case findings
4.1. Encountering edge cases
In fall 2017, a group of executives—the CEO and
CDO (Chief Digital Officer) at ShipBroker and the
CEO at the enterprise software provider—gathered to
discuss potential solutions to strategic challenges and
changes in the competitive market. Due to rapid
digitalization and adaptation of AIS data, the global
maritime trade industry had been subject to
commoditization and symmetrization of missioncritical information. Data on the activities of the global
trade fleet, which traditionally had been advantageous
to the brokers (according to one senior analyst), was
now becoming available and accessible across the
value chain. However, ShipBroker was not only facing
long-term risks of disintermediation, it was also
exposed to secreting and obscuring of ships’ digital
traces, such as tampering with data on the movement,
destination, and draught level of ships’ hull.
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4.2. The ‘fake news’ cases
In one of the many meetings that were focused on
evaluating the algorithm, a team of participants
collectively and carefully examined algorithmic
output: ship movements, their voyage patterns, and
drought change at certain ports. The problem case was
malicious or erroneous data records on the activity of
a certain ship. One possible explanation to the
inconsistencies was technical: that another ship had
interfered with its AIS signals. But the more likely
explanation was human: that the ship operator had
tampered with the data transmission. Typically, for
any voyage ship operators must manually type into
their AIS transponder information about its
destination, among other fields. For example, on
several occasions various members of the team
referred to a ‘thousand variations of the port of
Singapore’ which the algorithm had picked up. To
counter this problem, the data scientist on the team set
out to encode all kind of various portmanteaus,
abbreviations, acronyms, etc. related the port of
Singapore and subsequently collected any new
variation that the team encountered throughout the
process of evaluating the algorithmic outcome. Arrays
of port spellings were then integrated into the
algorithm’s ‘mapping function’ so that it could
normalize such instances going forward. While this
specific case made a reference point in subsequent
meetings, consensus was that there generally are
incentives for ship operators to obscure missioncritical data. This type of problem, often referred to as
“fake news” or faking destinations, was frequent.
Accordingly, the process of revising data and updating
the algorithm had to be repeated for the reminding
ports that accepted ships in this segment.

4.3. The withholding case
“This just arrived on the desk of one of the senior
brokers”, the CDO uttered while putting a print-out
onto the office desk. He was referring to a client
contract that specifically described conditions on the
timing for dissemination of voyage data. One client
had intentionally requested that information on its
ship’s whereabouts was to be withheld. More
specifically, by caps lock wording in the contract the
client had requested that by the time the vessel was
going to pass Skew (on the Northern coast of
Denmark) all involved parties should wait as long as
possible until transmitting the true destination of the
ship. The ship was departing from Russia with
hundreds of thousands of tons of crude oil and heading
for the southern US coast, but, apparently, the

‘observers’ did not need to know about this until there
was no doubt about its actual destination.
This situation somewhat confirmed extant
presumptions that strategic withholding of voyage
data is not an abnormal practice among competitors
and the fleet in general. Thus, the situation added to
the development agenda that also contract data should
be systemically collected and consolidated with AIS
data
to
augment
timely
decision-making.
Nevertheless, the speed at which AIS data was
collected and trade files were produced was deemed
important.

4.4. The going-dark cases
Ships “going dark” was another imminent issue in
the intelligence augmentation process. This problem
of incomplete or missing data on ship activity became
apparent in multiple meetings which dealt with a
reoccurring case—dubbed the ‘South Korean issue’ or
the ‘Korean case’ by the team members—in which a
substantial number of ships voyaging by the Korean
Peninsula suddenly yet continuously went missing
from the interactive monitoring tools. Unfortunately,
this resulted in distorted data sets. As the digital
executive explained to an external consultant: “When
a ship is approaching Korea, it always goes black, so
we need to use algorithms to determine which port the
ship actually goes to.” In addition, the project
management team approached the satellite operator
from which ShipBroker pulled AIS data to ask for
potential explanations. However, the satellite operator
answered that this was a general issue that was out of
their control and that there was no immediate solution
to it. Instead, the development team assumed that this
problem could be resolved by instructing the algorithm
to do ‘guesswork’ about the vessel movement based
on historical data on voyages.

4.5. The teleporting cases
“How can it possibly be that a vessel that was
located by the coast of Texas yesterday is observed in
Middle East Gulf at the present”, the CDO confronted
the development team. This is physically impossible,
so why is it the case, the team wondered. Issues like
this, referred to as ‘teleporting’ among our informants,
were rather frequently observed during the many
evaluation meetings focused on scrutinizing
algorithmic outcome. The data scientist and the rest of
the team were scratching their head on how to solve
these abnormalities because it debased the trade files.
With no ready solution at hand, investigations into
how the algorithm could be designed to handle such

Page 5661

teleporting issues were started. A couple of diagnosis
were suggested. The prevailing explanation was that
some ships might be equipped with duplicate
identification numbers. It was speculated that this has
historically been done for cost saving reasons. These
cases of abnormal output represented edge cases that
required cycles of human evaluation leading to
multiple yet uncertain explanations for the event.

5. Analysis and discussion
5.1. Assembling human and algorithmic
decision-making under uncertainty
Recent research has described how organizations
bring humans into the loop of the algorithm to
augment and improve the accuracy of analysis [27].
However, it remains uncertain how such augmentative
efforts can be efficiently integrated with the
opportunities for speed and scaling provided by
automation, under conditions of uncertainty. We build
on this to explore how organizations can achieve a
balance between the two in face of ‘edge cases’ as a
significant challenge for achieving accurate
algorithmic decision-making based on open data.

Figure 1 Human-in-the-loop pattern for
augmenting analytics (adapted from [27])
Most notably, we observed that preexisting
assemblages come to serve as backdrops to new
assemblages and comprise both the notions of
automation and augmentation. A key reason for the
emergence of this composite assemblage was the need
to overcome the challenges of uncertainty that come
with the input of open data (i.e. edge cases).

Towards their vision of achieving automated
analysis and algorithmic decision-making (the inner
loops in Figure 1), ShipBroker commenced from a
manual practice of computer-supported data analytics
(the outer loop) in which the mundane handling of
edge cases was considered to cause a bottleneck for
achieving timely analyses. As a response to this
bottleneck,
ShipBroker’s
development
team
introduced a classification algorithm to automate and
speed up the classification work.
Following the introduction of the algorithm, we
observed that the new practices of human auditing –
evaluating the algorithmic output against a ground
truth; and altering - changing the parameters and rules
of the algorithm were necessary to improve the
accuracy of the algorithm. However, this new work
also limited the performance of the system compared
to what a more automated approach would have
offered.
Yeow and Faraj [20] note that preexisting
assemblages serve as a backdrop to new or changed
assemblages, and that the performance of the focal
assemblage depends on its surrounding assemblages to
co-perform. In this case, we see that the outer 'human
assemblage'
(i.e.
data
acquisition-human
classification-analysis in Figure 1) is linked to and
serves a backdrop to the mid 'automation assemblage'
(data acquisition-algorithmic classification-analysis),
which in turn serves as a backdrop to the inner
‘augmentation
assemblage’
(algorithmic
classification-auditing-altering). Here, the main
purpose of the latter assemblage was to augment the
algorithm so as to make it perform upon encounters
with edge cases. In line with Yeow and Faraj’s
performative assemblage, our observations suggest
that parts of the assemblage (human classification)
could be extracted from a preexisting assemblage (the
human assemblage) to another (the augmentation
assemblage) creating different relationships, here
seeing that the work of human classification was
repurposed to provide a ground truth measure to the
auditing of edge cases. Similarly, the work of human
auditing could be extracted from the augmentation
assemblage to the center-most ‘training assemblage’
(algorithmic classification-human auditing).
While these arrangements correspond with the
input-processing-output task flow [4] (from left to
right in Figure 1), the assemblage approach of
Suchman [18] allowed us to also capture where
humans are included (avocation) in the assemblages to
deal with problematic situations (invocation) and
provide auditing and altering of the algorithm
(evocation). Here, altering was mainly concerned with
ambiguity and equivocality problems as new
frameworks were developed and introduced to the
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algorithm. Auditing entailed dealing with uncertainty
and complexity problems, which could be resolved by
providing the algorithm with (training) examples, as
congruent with the idea of interactive machine
learning algorithms [28].
The reconfiguration of this nested assemblage of
humans and the algorithm, augmentation and
automation processes, is dynamic in the sense that the
organization can have one or more of the assemblages
to co-perform more or less concurrently [20]. For
example, the (outer) manual/human assemblage can
run in parallel to the augmentation and automation
assemblages to allow continuation of 'business as
usual’ while also enabling design and use of the
algorithm. The assembling of algorithmic decisionmaking thus appears to be temporally emergent and
dependent on the former assemblages. This example
of a trajectory of algorithmic decision-making can
give researchers and practitioners a clue about the
evolving and relational problem-solving arrangements
which machine learning and AI spring from [19].

5.2. Implications for algorithmic decisionmaking in open data environments
Much of the literature on algorithmic decisionmaking address cases where the underlying data is
under organizational control. The issues with data
quality can then (in principle) be improved given
enough efforts. The situation is different with
externally sourced data. Discussing the strategic
implications of using available social media data,
Constantiou and Kallinikos [5] emphasizes that these
data are unstructured, heterogeneous, agnostic, and
trans-semiotic. They argue that this makes the
application of this data for strategic purposes more
challenging.
Our case relates to such external and highly
variegated data, however not from social media, but
from geospatial data shared via satellites and a global
information infrastructure. Here, the issues of data
quality and veracity are not “fixable”; this is a problem
for which the organization must put remedies in place
so that it can deal with the problem on a continuous
basis. This resembles the challenges encountered in
data-intensive, but physically inaccessible contexts
such as sensor-rich offshore installations that are
remotely monitored via data streams and algorithmic
processing [31]. The employees do not know whether
the data are or are not trustworthy, and they need to
deal with this, e.g. through visualizing data in order to
detect anomalous patterns in confounded data, sorting
out whether the signal is impacted by interferences,
and collectively sharing narratives that serve as

relevant background information, e.g., on previous
behavior of certain wells [32].

6. Conclusion
The use of open and externally sourced data as
input to algorithmic decision-making comes with
uncertainty issues. Introducing an algorithm and
automatic processing may add new challenges. The
initial expectation is often that the algorithm should
help resolve these data issues, however, the algorithm
itself is often perceived to be opaque and ‘blackboxed’. The concerns about data quality and
algorithmic opacity have generated recommendation
for algorithmic audits and other human control
mechanisms with the purpose to oversee and mitigate
undesired outcomes. As these mechanisms depend on
humans to both control and augment the algorithm,
they are often denoted “human-in-the-loop” setups
and defined by augmentation work. We believe that
the notion of performative assemblage provides a
useful perspective for further examining what the
interplay of automation and augmentation entail for
new ways of organizing algorithmic decision-making
under conditions of uncertainty.
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